Part III, Chapter V: The Wisconsin Campaign

By the end of May of 1830, Macomb's command of the "Northwoods Front," which consisted of the United States 2nd and 5th Infantry Regiments and equaled roughly 6,000 soldiers, had seen his elements seize an estimated one quarter of the Wisconsin territory in the southeastern portion of the region, originating from its border with the state of Illinois. As a result, he had gained a much needed American foothold in secessionist territory. The abandonment of Fort Pike, its subsequent capture by Northwoods forces in April and the American counter-campaign that followed had introduced and made clear the doctrine that the United States intended to follow involved a pattern of east to west conquest, as American military planners knew that the eastern territories of the Republic contained far less settlers than the west, and as a result the capture of these territories would provide early victories and as a result would hopefully and inherently curb the Republic's growing momentum. This strategy proved to be successful, as initial Northwoods response to the American campaign had proved minimal, as expected, and Wisconsin based militia that had once been instrumental in forcing the United States to abandon its efforts in continuing to supply Fort Pike with provisions and supplies had been quickly regarded as ineffective against the much larger and better organized advancing American forces. As May of 1830 faded into June, Macomb stood poised to capture the two largest settlements in the Wisconsin frontier, Green Bay and Prarie du Chien, and his staff quickly began drawing strategies to take both with as little bloodshed and collateral damage as possible, in an effort to use these settlements as bases of operation for inevitable follow-up campaigns. The two settlements also provided the United States with the obvious strategic benefit of expediting its resupply of provisions for Macomb's forces, as they both had been built and were equipped with (private) port facilities along the shores of Lake Superior and the Mississippi River, respectively.



The secret dealings between Carver and his international guests from Great Britain and France, Richard Pakenham and Claude Verdier respectively, however, had likewise caused General Pike to rework the Republic's own military strategy. As foreign aid, which had been promised to the Republic as a result of these diplomatic dealings, was not expected to arrive in Saint Anthony Falls until winter, Pike instead was necessitated to focus on a strategic delaying action, and had already begun measures to prepare his fledgling 200-man "Regiment" to implement this policy. This new overarching military strategy of the Republic thus entitled the tactics of the Upper Midwest's only formal Northwoods military formation to fight in small, scattered engagements, reminiscent of militia and irregular guerrilla warfare, and Pike immediately began training and drilling the Regiment throughout the month of May in realization of this fact in order to ensure it would be proficient in unconventional combat once deployed. By early June, however, Pike had received word from Albert Gallatin Ellis, a de facto member of the Council's "Wisconsin Delegation" and chief editor of "The Green Bay Intelligencer," that Macomb had put himself into a more than comfortable position to take the settlements of Green Bay and Prarie du Chien by the end of the month, and as a result both Ellis and James Duane Doty, the leader of the Council's "Wisconsin Delegation," desperately urged Pike to put his men into action, since both the people he represented that had elected him (and more or less his own personal property) would soon be at risk. Pike however, knew from his experience as a former frontier expeditionary leader that little could be done to save the towns from inevitable American occupation, as evidenced by the towns being positioned in the expansive open terrain of southern Wisconsin, which was largely devoid of forested areas, and thus ideal for movement of large formations and offered no natural bottlenecks or chokepoints aside from the occasional stream crossing, putting him at a distinct disadvantage if he decided to deploy his men to contest the American advance in the region. Furthermore, Pike knew from his experience in the War of 1812 that Macomb had distinguished himself as a competent military leader, as he had lead several successful attacks against the British along the Niagara during the early years of the war and has thus become well versed and comfortable with commanding large formations in terrain that obviously favored conventional warfare. To add to the disadvantages, Pike also correctly assessed that the two rifle companies stationed at Fort Pike that he commanded and continued to drill and train on guerrilla tactics throughout the months of May and into early June still required further training, and were as a result unready to engage the Americans. With these obstacles present, Pike regrettably replied to Ellis and the Council that the towns of Green Bay and Prarie du Chien (the third and fourth largest settlements in the entire Upper Midwest, respectively) would have to be sacrificed to the American advance in order for the Republic to gain a much better military advantage, as northern Wisconsin and the upper peninsula of Michigan provided the much needed forested areas and the tactical convenience for the Republic that southern Wisconsin lacked, and fighting unconventionally in open terrain through irregular guerrilla tactics was deemed by Pike as impractical and would imminently fail if undertaken, in part to the ratio of 6,000 versus 200. The northern portion was also a shorter distance from Saint Anthony Falls, and from this region Pike also had a greater ability to maintain lines of communication to the Council, as couriers from the "front" would be required to travel a much shorter distance to deliver correspondence, and consequentially this would aid in the effort to resupply his forces once they began to run low on provisions and ammunition, as supplies also would take less time to reach him and his men once the requirement for these supplies to be provided had been addressed to the Council. According to Pike, these arguments in themselves proved that the Republic's military forces (of which there were still very few in formality) would thus be much more effective and could possibly achieve its main goal of delaying the American advance if it simply waited to engage the Americans as they moved farther north, rather than waste invaluable resources attempting to halt them in the south. The Council, as it lacked military experience even across all of its members cumulatively to the same degree as the illustrious and proven General Pike, whose reputation preceded him, had no choice but to agree to the general's proposal to wait for favorable conditions in the north.



The first week of June thus saw Macomb rapidly initiate his plan to take both Green Bay and Prarie du Chien in quick succession, as expected. By June 4th of 1830, both towns had been quickly encircled by more than eight companies of American rifles and two batteries of American artillery each, and its inhabitants were thus unable to displace or flee the coming occupation due to the envelopment. Fortunately for the Republic, however, the populations of both towns had seen a dramatic decrease throughout the late months of 1829, as many able bodied male residents had chosen to acknowledge the Northwoods "rallying cry" (which had been distributed by way of media and press) to join the ongoing protest and assembled mob at Saint Anthony Falls along the Mississippi. Nonetheless, a significant amount of women, children, infants and elderly men still remained, and few were willing to contest or resist the swelling American forces, nor did they have the means to do so. Macomb was quick to note that due to the unexpected lack of resistance, his soldiers were still likely to participate in acts of violence regardless, as nearly three quarters of his enlisted men were northerners, as the appropriation of forces by Congress to conduct the campaign had allocated mostly northern-based soldiers to execute the task of quelling the rebellion, as Washington and Jackson both assessed that southern-based soldiers were more likely to show sympathy for the secessionists (especially those hailing from South Carolina) and were thus at risk to be ineffective in combat against them. As a result, Macomb's ranks were naturally opposed to secessionist movement, which they regarded as traitorous and illegal, in keeping with popular northern American sentiment. Macomb, however, realized that the strategic and tactical consequences of allowing looting and pillaging would be drastically negative both domestically and internationally, and the benefits of conducting the war in a gentleman-like manner far outweighed the benefits of conducting the war as though the people his formation were fighting against were foreign or of a different race, as the latter option also presented the opportunity for southern states to reignite their discontent, and upon doing so his campaign would likely suffer as a result, as assets would then have to be pulled from his command in order to once again quell rising agrarian protest in the south. Macomb, in acknowledgement of these facts, thus issued a direct general order before the onset of the occupation of the towns of Green Bay and Prarie du Chien, and stated that no secessionist property or people were to be harmed, damaged or interfered with in any way, shape or form unless in direct self defense, and any soldier caught disobeying this general order was to be immediately reprimanded by court martial. The order was quickly deemed as unpopular by Macomb's ranks, but the soldiers had no choice but to abide regardless, as an eventual forfeiture of pay and allowances, demotion and physical harm at the hands of their officers for disobeying a direct order was deemed as undesirable in comparison to looting or pillaging. Macomb, however, was quick to amend the order, and stated that controlling the population's movements and eliminating its ability to migrate further north to join the still growing mob of secessionists in Saint Anthony Falls was still paramount in ensuring that support for the "Republic" did not increase, and thus included a special provision to enforce curfews, and established a strategy that disallowed the ability of civilians to travel any farther than the outskirts of their respective towns during the occupation unless they required dire medical attention, effectively forcing them to remain static.



By June 20th, both Green Bay and Prarie du Chien had been captured effortlessly and bloodlessly, and had been consequently occupied by American forces. Macomb quickly worked to consolidate his gains in the region, and by the end of the month the area under American occupation and control now extended from the shores of Lake Michigan and its Green Bay peninsula in the east to Prarie La Crosse (which, ironically, Pike himself had named during his expedition in the early 1800's) along the Mississippi in the west, and both Prarie du Chien and Green Bay now safely contained the divided headquarters of Macomb and his staff. The small port facilities of the two settlements had also been conveniently captured intact, and thus provided the Americans an expedited avenue to supply their 6,000 soldiers in the frontier, eliminating the untimely endeavor of transporting provisions and supplies overland. By the beginning of July, Macomb was now in a once again comfortable position to continue his conquest of the Wisconsin territory, of which only half now remained free of American forces.



Upon Green Bay and Prarie du Chien's unavoidable capture, however, Pike was once again pressured by the Northwoods Council to deploy his men in order to delay the American advance from reaching the northwestern portion of Wisconsin, which they estimated would be under American control by the end of August (and thus in a position to capture Saint Anthony Falls and Fort Pike and end the revolution) if not engaged. Pike had been busy meticulously training his 200-man "Regiment" of regulars in the tactics and strategies of irregular guerrilla warfare throughout the months of May and June, but was still unsure how the element would react or perform under direct engagement of the enemy, and estimated that he would require another month of continued training in order to completely ensure their effectiveness in combat. Nonetheless, the effortless and seemingly unopposed advance of Macomb through the Wisconsin territory had provoked the worry of the Council and the Northwoods people to such an extent that Pike was now left with little choice but to forward deploy his element to the northern reaches of Wisconsin ahead of schedule in order to buy the Republic valuable time. Clandestine French and British aid to the Republic was still promised and underway, but had not been expected to reach Saint Anthony Falls until winter due to the American closure of the Mississippi and Lake Superior, and thus Pike and the Council agreed that Macomb and his forces could not be allowed to cross the Mississippi into Minnesota before the onset of the first snowfall, and further agreed that if they were prohibited from doing so they would thus be required to enter winter quarters, as continuing a land campaign with such a large element in the harsh conditions would be impractical without Macomb enduring a large quantity of cold weather casualties, as almost the entire American 2nd Infantry Regiment lacked cold weather clothing due to their hasty redeployment from the south to the Upper Midwest frontier in May. The arrival of modern firearms and British advisers would enable Pike to eventually field a proposed entire formal infantry regiment of 3,000 men, which he could then use to more effectively hold Fort Pike and the surrounding region against an inevitable American assault across the Mississippi once the Americans broke winter quarters and continued their campaign upon the emergence of spring in 1831.



As Pike began to develop plans to move his 200-man element eastward across the Mississippi into Wisconsin no later than mid-July, the fact that they still lacked suitable ammunition and modern firearms was still a well known and present issue to both the General and the Council. Even though Pike and his regiment were slated to only harass and engage in guerrilla warfare against the much larger American forces, the element still required to gain every obtainable advantage they could muster before deploying forward to eventually meet the enemy. As French support - which had promised to fill this advantage - had not yet arrived nor was it expected to before winter, the Council desperately began to look for solutions in order to outfit Pike's element with equally modern firearms in as short amount of time as possible, as Pike's plan of movement dictated that he had only two weeks from the beginning of July before his element would be forced to "step off" from Fort Pike to conduct their delaying mission. Carver quickly circulated a request for all Northwoods settlers assembled in Saint Anthony Falls interested in aiding Pike and the regiment to bring forward and voluntarily give up privately owned modern rifles and ammunition regarded in good condition in order to allow them to contest the American advance in Wisconsin, and highlighted that the need for these firearms was paramount to the sustainability of independence, and was careful to ensure that the circulated pamphlets on which this request was stated gave no word as to when these firearms were needed by, mainly in a direct effort to conceal Pike's future movements and maintain operational security. The response was resoundingly positive, and by July 5th nearly all of the 200 men in Pike's regiment had been equipped and outfitted with modern rifles, and due to this almost none remained in private ownership in the entire Upper Midwest, highlighting their rarity and utter inability to be replaced until winter when more would (hopefully) arrive from France. The prior private owners of these rifles were given the outdated rifles they replaced for compensation by Carver, but had been given no guarantee that the rifles they had sacrificed for the Republic would be returned following the conclusion of hostilities. Ammunition for the rifles had also been supplied in great numbers by Northwoods volunteers, and Pike estimated that by the end of the "lethal fundraiser" (as it was humorously labeled by Carver) he had gathered over 24,000 rounds of ammunition, enough for roughly 120 rounds per soldier, or three full combat loads, and a proportionate amount of gunpowder and paper to accompany the stockpile. This dramatic effort and call to aid Pike, however, had left the Minnesota territory virtually absent of a means to defend itself by those who had given up their means to do so, and thus highlighted the necessity for Pike's force to succeed in Wisconsin if both he and his constituents wished to see continued independence.



Thus, with a force trained only to the best that time and the strategic situation was able to allow and with a fully equipped 200-man "Regiment," Pike began his march eastward and broke camp at Fort Pike on midnight of July 7th, 1830, leading his regiment over the Mississippi and onto Wisconsin soil under the cover of darkness in order to conceal his movement from the public, and as a result the occasion received no fanfare or celebration. Pike reached the Lake Wissota reservoir of the Chippewa River by July 15th, and immediately established the site as his temporary headquarters and main bivouac. From there, he began to create plans to intercept and attack forward American elements throughout summer and autumn, and anticipated Macomb's scouts and smaller forward reconnaissance elements would be within striking distance by as early as July 18th. As Macomb continued to push his forces northwest across the state throughout July, the first official engagement of the war and a test of both side's resolve seemed imminent. On July 19th, Pike had received word that his party had spotted a small American forward element only 2 miles downriver from the bivouac, and Pike personally lead roughly 50 men of his element in response to ambush the small, 20-man American reconnaissance platoon, which was later regarded as a contingent of the 5th Infantry Regiment. Using cover and the surrounding woodlines, the Northwoods infantry opened fire. The engagement and the men's proficiency during their first actual engagement of the Americans was appreciatively successful, and the 1st North Star Infantry Regiment had won its first official victory in battle, slaughtering the platoon in a quickly decisive 30 second firefight to the tune of no incurred casualties. The quickly dispatched force also provided Pike with 8 additional rifles and 80 extra rounds of ammunition, both replenishing the rounds that had been expended in the engagement and adding an additional number to the significant Northwoods stockpile.



Macomb quickly heard news of the engagement, but due to no remaining survivors, discounted it as a simple abnormality that had surely (he thought) been the work of Wisconsin based militia or possibly Northwoods Native American allies. Macomb began to question the insignificance, however, when a report of another reconnaissance platoon of the 5th Infantry had likewise been similarly engaged and destroyed on July 21st in relatively the same geographic area (which had unbeknownst to him been the handiwork of Pike's regulars, yet again.) Unsure and hesitant, Macomb halted any future advance of his southern flanks and sent four entire companies (a battalion) of the 5th Infantry to investigate, an unfortunate necessity, as Macomb had continually and long before been explained the urgency of the situation to take Saint Anthony Falls before the onset of winter by Jackson, who he maintained nearly constant correspondence with, as the President now had an insatiable appetite to hear of current progress in the region. Pike's scouts quickly spotted the large contingent that he assumed had been dispatched by Macomb to investigate the discrepancies of the last two seemingly random and fatal engagements, and Pike quickly assembled his men and broke camp at Lake Wissota on July 23rd, but not before he and his men carefully and meticulously probed the ground of the former campsite in order to ensure that the Regiment was leaving no trace of its former presence in the area. Satisfied, the regiment turned north, once again under cover of darkness, then east, and Pike planned to establish another bivouac and temporary headquarters at Big Bull Falls (later known as Lake Wausau,) where he would then engage forward elements of Macomb's other "half," the 2nd Infantry Regiment, in similar fashion, whose advance had not yet been ceased by Macomb, as they had not yet been engaged at the scale that the 5th Infantry had to the west. Pike reached Lake Wasau on the morning July 25th, paused briefly to allow his men to rest for but a few hours, and then likewise resumed scouting the area in order to find smaller and similar complacent American forward elements. On July 26th, scouts of the regiment spotted two separate American platoon-sized formations, and thus twice on July 26th Pike's elements once again demonstrated their effectiveness, and ambushed the elements with unparalleled success, once again leaving no survivors. In the four engagements the Regiment had fought in, Pike and his outfit had accounted for 86 American fatalities since arriving in Wisconsin while incurring no casualties of their own, and upon the end of every engagement had replaced all of the rounds they had used and had likewise captured over 40 American rifles, which they had put to immediate use to equip those members of the Regiment who had not yet been fortunate enough to be given a modern equivalent during the "lethal fundraiser" almost a month before, and in most cases the American models were even deemed far superior to the Regiment's own.



Macomb had received word of the similar engagements that his northern flank had incurred by July 28th, which was composed of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, and his immediate frustration was nothing but apparent. The fact that his discovering and later investigative elements had reported that those cadavers that had been left were also stripped of all ammunition and rifles only contributed to his growing disappointment in being unable to explain how 86 dead Americans had been slaughtered and ransacked at the hands of a yet unseen and completely unreported enemy. Macomb's confusion was also highlighted due to the fact that prior to July 19th, he had only received inaccurate and inadequate fire, none of which had ever accounted for more than 10 American casualties, from random Wisconsin militia, the majority of which had displaced further north following the capture of Green Bay and Prarie du Chien, yet past this seemingly insignificant date and in almost two weeks following, he had lost four entire platoons of scouts. As the statistics and investigative reports of the engagements began to filter into the higher American headquarters at Green Bay, Macomb was convinced that the engagements were not the handiwork of random groups of untrained Wisconsin militia or Northwoods Native American allies, in part due to their effectiveness, but instead speculated and correctly attributed the acts directly to Zebulon Pike - as he was the only man in the entire Upper Midwest that Macomb could possibly think would be capable of delivering such decisive (albeit small) blows to his advance, and was also the only man out of all the secessionists in the Upper Midwest who held any kind of relative military leadership experience. Macomb's first problem, though, lied not in how to directly counter Pike's "insurgency operation" (as he later called it in distaste) but in understanding what force Pike had brought with him to the Wisconsin frontier, and as Pike's ambushes had not yet provided any survivors and as his force had not yet been spotted, the Americans were thus unable to ascertain this knowledge, much to Macomb's growing anger. The embarrassing loss of nearly 100 men in the span of 2 weeks with no apparent negative results for the opposing enemy and his inability to explain why had thus lead to the news of the events to not be reported to Washington, as the sharp backlash Macomb would likely receive from Jackson was regarded as undesirable and the negative mark on his reputation was regarded as even moreso. As if Pike could sense Macomb's frustration, however, on the night of July 29th, the Regiment once again engaged another American force of roughly a squad-sized element of unguarded 2nd Infantry noncombatant quartermasters at Stevens Point, a former Menominee encampment, where the quartermasters had established a temporary bivouac, adding another 8 dead to their tally.



The latest report of the dead quartermasters reached Macomb by August 1st, who by July 28th had completely halted the advance of both of his fronts due to the recent attacks, mostly in an effort to gain situational awareness on the so far undiscovered enemy. As these attempts also proved fruitless, it quickly prompted Macomb to write and enforce a new policy in order to mitigate American complacency and the sharp rise in casualties, and he ordered that no elements smaller than one entire rifle company were authorized to move anywhere throughout the currently occupied Wisconsin territory without his explicit consent. This thus enabled the Americans to continue their advance in the hopes that the attacks would become less frequent and as a result far less lethal, although they now moved at a remarkably slower pace, as the inherent difficulty in maintaining control of company and battalion-sized formations by subordinate commanders through ground that obviously required coverage by smaller echelons was a quickly discovered hardship. As the Americans continued their advance, Pike once again displaced from his Lake Wausau bivouac under cover of darkness, carefully covering his tracks as he previously did at his Lake Wissota bivouac, and with morale at high levels due to his success, marched north with his two rifle companies in order to create more distance between himself and the still much larger advancing American regiments. Nonetheless, the reports from his scouts that detailed the Americans were no longer moving in any platoon or squad sized elements what-so-ever had convinced Pike and his men that their delaying actions were working, although this new tactic provided an inherently new challenge for the Northwoods resisters, as their targets of opportunity - which had essentially been much smaller echelons - had been entirely discarded as a result. The devastating Northwoods attacks also had quickly spread throughout the American ranks, and their morale had dropped significantly as a result. As rumor spread that Zebulon Pike, the famous hero of the War of 1812 who had lead the United States to victory in the Ontario Campaign was responsible, a new nickname for the General arose - "the Wolf of the Mississippi." News of this nickname quickly spread to occupied Wisconsin settlers in Green Bay and Prarie du Chien, and thus likewise spread through secret correspondence to Saint Anthony Falls - and the moniker for the now championed Northwoods hero, whose success had become public in Minnesota, quickly became popular.



On August 9th, Pike had reached suitable ground and enough distance from the Americans to establish his third temporary bivouac at a water reservoir of the Chippewa River (later recognized and named as Holcombe Flowage decades later,) which by now had become a familiar site and navigational reference for the regiment. Precariously, however, the far western edge of the American advance under the 5th Infantry Regiment, who was most familiar with the terrain, was only 100 miles east from the main Mississippi River bridge crossing, just a few short 300 yards downriver of Fort Pike. Pike thus new if Macomb, with enough effort, pulled his northern 2nd Infantry Regiment on line with his southwestern most flank and bypassed La Pointe, he could easily push to the Mississippi's banks by the end of the month and be in a well suited position to advance directly into Saint Anthony Falls unopposed. Pike dictated his only option would be to regrettably (and against his own doctrine) engage one of the many American company or (even more regrettably) battalion-sized elements now trekking westward across the Wisconsin frontier, whose numbers while doing so obviously far surpassed those that Pike had at his disposal. The tactic of Macombe by disallowing his own forces to travel in numbers no smaller than a company proved to be working, and as his men had followed them without question now forced Pike to commit to a most uncomfortable engagement rivaling that of conventional warfare, which also inevitably put him at the risk of losing some of his men in combat, which he now regarded as unacceptable, as these men were undoubtedly irreplaceable due in part to their experience they had so far gained during the campaign, and Pike knew they would all later be needed and instrumental in training more soldiers for an envisioned defense of Fort Pike and the bridge it controlled the following spring.



Thus, out of options and running out of time, Pike quickly acted, and dispatched multiple reconnaissance parties in order to find the least prepared element of the westbound American rifle companies, and also to find the most advantageous terrain possible to ambush this company from, upon its discovery. By morning of August 10th, his scouts had returned and reported that a company of the 2nd Infantry Regiment's 2nd Battalion had been spotted to the north, and were advancing westward cautiously to an unnamed water reservoir (later named Dairyland Reservoir also a few decades later) a few miles upriver that was roughly in similar size to the one Pike and his regiment had established as a temporary headquarters only two days earlier. Pike decided to move north and establish positions in order to initiate a complex ambush of the element at the reservoir with 175 of his men, leaving only 25 to guard the bivouac. The difficulty in moving such a large portion of his numbers in the middle of the day, however, quickly worried the General that his plans would be discovered before he could deploy his men, but these were discarded as the element had pushed ahead no scouts in order to reconnoiter the terrain ahead of them (as it was against the guidance and doctrine that Macomb had given of traveling in no less than a company sized element,) and the unspotted Northwoods regiment quickly emplaced on the eastern edge of the lake behind cover with plenty of time to spare, leaving a 2 mile long gap between them and the advancing American company. As the company finally advanced in column within rifle range, Pike gave the command to open fire, and the regiment sent a 175-rifle volley into the human mass of American soldiers. What would result would be called the Battle of the Reservoir. The Americans quickly broke ranks and sought cover, returning inaccurately unconcentrated and sometimes blind fire at the North Star regiment. The engagement persisted for nearly 5 excruciating minutes before the Americans finally rallied and withdrew from the site of the engagement. The American company had been completely shattered, and as Pike and his men scavenged the bodies for food and ammunition counted 45 dead and 13 wounded Americans, and the wounded were promptly and regrettably executed by order of Pike, as he dictated that his element's tactics, which had so far depended largely on speed, could not afford neither wounded (even in their own formation) nor prisoners, as the element could thus only move as fast as its slowest member. Pike's gambled engagement, however, proved to be expensive, as the Northwoods regulars had expended nearly 2,500 rounds (nearly 15 rounds per soldier involved) in the resulting "short" 5 minute firefight, and had suffered three fatalities to American fire. Furthermore, the remnants of the American company (which Pike estimated to be anywhere from 30 - 40 soldiers based on the amount of American dead) had been allowed to escape, and would likely be questioned by American investigators in order to gain intelligence on Pike's disposition and the location of his forces.



Pike quickly returned to his bivouac with his element after hastily hiding and disposing of his own dead by forcibly submerging them into the reservoir, as he had no time to dig graves far from the site of the engagement nor give them a proper Catholic burial (as nearly all of his men were Catholic, in keeping with the majority of most Northwoods people) which his men desired to do. He quickly broke camp a few hours later, and stopped at daybreak on August 11th to establish his fourth temporary bivouac at Cornell Lake, roughly midway in between his former first bivouac at Lake Wissota and his third at the then unnamed Holcombe Flowage reservoir, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to determine the American response to the previous day's actions. The patrols quickly returned and happily announced that the entire front had been halted once again by Macomb, in an effort to give respite to his men to reverse their rapidly dwindling morale. Macomb, who had moved his temporary headquarters from Green Bay to a forward outpost some 100 miles westward in order to better command his campaign at the end of July, was at a complete loss for what further action to take upon hearing news of one of the 2nd Infantry's companies being completely destroyed the previous day. Reports from the survivors of the company, however, had at last confirmed Macomb's suspicion that Pike had been responsible, but was also further perplexed by the irregular tactics employed by Pike. Furthermore, the survivors reported that the dark green uniforms of the hostile rifles had added to the confusion and in part complimented their tactics, as the colors of the uniforms blended in and matched the surroundings of their cover, adding to the already difficult process of identifying enemy targets for the American victims. Macomb, attempting to digest the new information, issued no further commands to his forces, and they once again remained static on August 12th. Finally, by August 13th, Macomb once again authorized movement, but as Pike had escaped the Battle of the Reservoir's surrounding area, Macomb felt as though his forces were completely helpless against another inevitable Northwoods ambush at the hands of Pike, and in truth, he was entirely correct, as he had done nothing to prevent it from happening again.



Thus, on August 13th, another company of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, this time hailing from its 1st Battalion, had been spotted by Regimental scouts moving towards the Chippewa River near a similarly large reservoir similar in size to the unnamed August 10th (Dairyland) Reservoir. Pike once again moved southeast to capitalize on the opportunity with roughly 150 of his men (leaving the remaining 47 behind to guard the bivouac, in an effort to conserve ammunition in the coming engagement by bringing less men) and employed his troops in earnest along the western bank of the River, at the site where it was most shallow and where its current was not as strong, as he estimated that it was where the company would attempt to cross in an effort not to damage their rifles, which were far from waterproof. The company, arriving in a complacent column, once again sent forth no scouts, and upon entering rifle range, Pike and his men once again opened fire, in eerie resemblance to the August 10th engagement. The American company was quickly and once again shattered by the regiment, and the Battle of the Chippewa River Crossing (as it was later named,) after a brief (but once again excruciating in Pike's opinion) 4 minutes, ended with the remaining American soldiers withdrawing. As Pike's men once again scouted and scavenged the dead, they counted 59 dead and 29 wounded (whom they once again dispatched) at the cost of only 2 dead of their own. Their remaining numbers, once again estimated as to be anywhere from 20 - 30 men, once again had been allowed to escape, as the Northwoods soldier had been unable to pursue them. Pike, almost as if he had now developed a sense of routine, quickly forcibly submerged his dead in the nearby reservoir (once again to the disdain of his Catholic soldiers, who had agreed with the unfortunate necessity) after likewise scavenging their bodies, rejoined the bivouac with his remaining element, and displaced west in search of another temporary headquarters.



As more reports filtered to Macomb on August 14th about another engagement that had resulted in 88 American dead with no trace of Pike, he once again halted the entire front's advance, as the morale of his men throughout both of his regiments had plummeted to such a degree that many were even considering desertion. The effects of Pike's unconventional tactics could not be ignored any longer. Since the arrival of the 200 man 1st North Star Infantry Regiment in the Wisconsin theater on July 15th, Pike and his men, between this date and August 13th, had accounted for a staggeringly unacceptable 240 American fatalities in less than 30 days at an unknown (to Macomb, as for all he knew was no fatalities at all) cost of only 5 of their own - whereas before their arrival the Americans had only sustained 10 casualties in the previous 75 days. Due to this severity, Macomb was now unable to keep the secret of his now costly Wisconsin Campaign from Washington, and when word had finally reached the White House by early September, Jackson had been enraged by the numbers. Macomb thus decided to consolidate his gains, and in order to mitigate further Northwoods reprisal, to amend his previous order regarding echelon movement, and dictated that no element smaller than a battalion would be allowed to move anywhere throughout the Wisconsin frontier unless under his express permission. After a very long and unnatural respite of 2 entire weeks in order to quell dissent throughout his ranks, and with pressing urgency and threats of demotion from Jackson, Macomb finally continued his movements northwest on September 2nd.



Pike and his element, following their August 13th engagement, decided wisely to move only by night and arrived at the eastern shore of Tainter Lake on August 15th, a large reservoir at the confluence of the Hay and Red Cedar Rivers, and he quietly established his fifth temporary bivouac in the area. Perplexed and worried by the lack of American movement, Pike's troubles instead turned to elation as his scouts returned on August 15th, and reported that Macomb had halted his entire advance in the theater. Pike ordered continued surveillance, and remained steadfast (but remarkably bored, as he later recalled) at his bivouac for 2 entire weeks awaiting further movement from Macomb's forces. On September 2nd, his scouts once again returned and announced that Macomb had resumed his advance, but delivered startlingly concurrent reports - no element in the theater remained smaller than a battalion sized echelon. Pike quickly and wisely regarded this fact as an effort by Macomb to mitigate future Northwoods attacks, but in essence this new doctrine also fulfilled the element's initial objective in the Wisconsin Campaign, as this tactic would drastically delay the advance of the Americans, who would struggle to retain the continuity of their formations in forested terrain. Pike thus calculated that if Macomb continued his policy of only allowing battalion sized elements to advance across the Wisconsin frontier, it would be impossible for him to advance past the confluence, much less to the banks of the Mississippi by the first snowfall, which Pike expected by November at the latest, and he would then be required to enter winter quarters. Pike knew, however, that if his regiment discontinued their attacks, Macomb would reverse his policy in an effort to cover more ground, and thus displacement from the theater was not yet an option. Pike concluded, however, that an engagement of his remaining 195 soldiers against a 600-man American rifle battalion was highly impractical, and thus his ability to engage the Americans on terms and ground of his choosing had become extremely limited.



The inherent limitations of future engagements, however, had not dissuaded Pike from looking for opportunity. On September 4th, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Infantry had been spotted in traveling formation west of the Chippewa River, in between Pike's forces and Lake Wissota, the site of the Regiment's first bivouac, and was quickly regarded as a possible target of opportunity due in part to the observed complacency of its soldiers by Pike's scouts. Pike immediately began to search for ground advantageous to his forces, and was quickly able to find several treelines north of the battalion's long axis, who would eventually pass by them as they continued westward, and provided excellent cover and strong withdrawal opportunities for his men, as it also contained a significant amount of low ground on its north side opposite of the treeline. Pike quickly moved with his entire element to the site of the future ambush, and emplaced there hours ahead of the scheduled advance of the battalion on September 5th. On mid-morning of September 5th, the battalion advanced within rifle range, and Pike's men, now disciplined, experienced and well versed in their tactics, delivered a precise and massive 195-man rifle volley into the entire broad axis of the American battalion with resounding effect. As Pike regarded that the battalion would quickly win fire superiority over his much smaller element if a prolonged engagement ensued, each individual firer of the regiment quickly displaced after discharging their weapon, as they had been briefed, and assembled into the surrounding low ground north of the treeline, which Pike had identified beforehand, and quickly began movement, ending the "Treeline Engagement" before it even started. Pike incurred no casualties, as by the time of the displacement the Americans had not even organized to return fire, and paused briefly after marching nearly 12 miles north, and then waited for nightfall. They then turned quickly west under cover of darkness, returning to their previous bivouac site on the eastern shore of Tainter Lake. Unknown to Pike and his men, who had obviously not stayed in order to conduct a proper battle damage assessment, the American battalion had suffered 39 dead and 64 wounded in the engagement, and a further half of the wounded would later succumb to their injuries.



Macomb, infuriated, once again ordered a halt to his entire advance, and established a strong defensive perimeter, and would once again not continue movement of his forces until nearly 2 weeks later. Pike, rather than continue his campaign, however, was now forced to make a difficult decision regarding his withdrawal. Pike and his Regiment had been strangely fortunate in escaping prevalent illnesses throughout their campaign, illnesses of which that ran rampant during the summer months in the Wisconsin region, specifically malaria, which he and his Regiment had avoided but still proved to be a significant threat to his fighting force given the mosquito population of the area, even with decreasing temperatures. Further, a slight occurrence of sudden fever among roughly two dozen of his men that inherently provided danger of spreading forced the General into making a difficult decision. With his regiment running low on food and water due to an inability to scavenge dead Americans (which his men had become almost disturbingly proficient at doing), and with his men exhausted from nearly 2 months of continuous fighting, Pike was troubled at the aspect of withdrawing from the Wisconsin Theater, but nonetheless was now convinced (when considering his latest action) that Macomb would not reach the Mississippi before first snowfall - even if he reverted his guidance back to company sized elements, and the Regiment exited the theater quietly and returned to Fort Pike on September 14th, 1830, once again under cover of darkness and to no celebration or fanfare, a withdrawal of which that Pike regarded as paradoxically both necessary and voluntary. Pike's Wisconsin Campaign, which he later regarded as only a modest effort, would later be regarded as the most successful western military guerrilla campaign ever fought in recorded history. In 60 days, the 1st North Star Infantry Regiment had accounted for 311 American dead and 32 wounded - over 5% of Macomb's total original 6,000 man force in the Wisconsin Theater - at the cost of only 5 of their own, and had cumulatively expended nearly 7,000 rounds of ammunition. Pike's successful interruption of the American advance to the Mississippi had been a resounding success and had bought the Republic valuable time, and upon his return to the Fort (after a 7 day allowance for his men to rest at their leisure) immediately began to improve its fortifications in preparation for the renewed American counteroffensive in the spring of 1831.