Part III, Chapter VII: The Minnesota Campaign

The arrival of spring in 1831 came in predictable fashion by April, and welcomed itself in perfect estimation to the time that both Pike and Macomb had originally anticipated for it to do so. Although prior weather patterns reflected a large amount of variable factors into when spring actually arrived in the Upper Midwest after its harsh winter, both forces had initially planned their future operations around the melting of snow in April, as this month was considered the "average" time spring usually arrived, although observation of the climate of the region dictated that this, regardless, was an unreliable estimate. Pike, who had lived in the Saint Anthony Falls area since 1821, had long grown accustomed to the region's weather and its unpredictable nature, but nonetheless had planned the training and preparation of his Regiment to finish no later than this month due to multiple factors. This was mostly credited to the fact that Pike - upon learning of the long awaited arrival of British and French foreign aid in December of 1830, and thus finally the availability to field a 3,000 man regiment in full - understood the practical limitations of transforming 2,800 raw recruits who had previously been farmers and laborers into soldiers, mostly due to his (what he regarded as unfortunate) experience in singlehandedly training a similar (although smaller by roughly 2,600) demographic in preparation for his Wisconsin Campaign in 1830. Furthermore, even with the addition of a dozen British advisers and 195 experienced men of his own, which had previously been unavailable, Pike only expected to train, arm and finally field his entire 3,000 man force by this month in 1831 at the absolute earliest, as it would be impossible to do so (at least to the General's reputably strict standards) under any smaller time constraint without sacrificing effectiveness in combat, which Pike regarded as paramount to the Republic's chances to fend off a likely American military counter campaign. Likewise to Pike's benefit, his opposite, Macomb, lacked any kind of notable experience in the region, (aside from the experience he had already accumulated, which was regarded as trivial in comparison) mostly due to being appointed to several commands in southern U.S. states prior to his nomination to command the overall Northwoods campaign by Jackson, and as a result had also (involuntarily) surrounded himself with officers on his staff (notably from the 5th Infantry Regiment) who had gained a significant amount of knowledge concerning weather patterns in the Upper Midwest due to the Regiment's former garrison posting at Fort Pike from 1821 - 1828 (when they were ordered to abandon it due to the untenable dissent only 8 miles upriver.) The advice of these officers on Macomb's staff argued that the average temperature of the combined Wisconsin-Minnesota frontiers would not allow favorable conditions for their men (as almost the entire 2nd Infantry Regiment lacked winter clothing) and as a result Macomb was likewise forced to wait to launch his inevitable "spring offensive" in April, as despite the anticipated gradual remission of snow throughout the region in the early months of the year (and thus the ability to effectively move troops,) daily temperatures would remain significantly low and could thus cause potential damage to his manpower through cold weather casualties, manpower of which had already depreciated due to desertion and Pike's military counter-campaign in the summer and fall of 1830. This primary factor, numerical advantage, (in addition to the low morale of the force itself) was also emphasized by Macomb as an advantage that required serious effort to be maintained, as intelligence efforts regarding the size of Pike's force that he had engaged his own forces with in the Wisconsin Campaign (and the likely expansion of this force due to the reported arrival of foreign aid by the American and Northwoods press) was still unreliable, if not completely nonexistent.



In March of 1831, Pike's preparations for the defense of the confluence of the Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers (where Fort Pike laid) and the small but maintained bridge that ran across the northern leg of the Minnesota River only 300 yards south of the Fort's southernmost walled perimeter were nearly complete. However, at the onset of preparations, Pike still lacked one serious essential asset. Pike's intelligence and reconnaissance efforts regarding Macomb and his movement had previously come only from unreliable and voluntarily shared correspondence between assembled secessionists in Saint Anthony Falls and the families they had left behind in the now occupied Wisconsin frontier, mostly in Green Bay and Prarie du Chien. These "left-behind" families had played a pivotal role in the winter of 1830 by describing the halt of Macomb and his subsequent construction of winter quarters, thus confirming the success of Pike's delaying action in the Wisconsin Campaign, but were nonetheless restricted in movement from their respective towns by the garrisoned Americans stationed there under order of Macomb, and thus were kept at a far distance from the "main body" of Macomb's forces, and their (usually unintentional) reporting of American military movement was hindered from being timely and effective as a result, especially since their continued correspondence was heavily monitored and censored. Pike concluded that being able to accurately define and observe the movements of Macomb and his forces westward (which were estimated to begin at any time) thus required immediate resolution, as the past "secret correspondence," while beneficial, was regarded as far too untimely of an endeavor, and Pike determined that relying on this medium for information regarding enemy troop movements would likely prove redundant, as by the time future correspondence was voluntarily shared with the General upon its reception by secessionists in Saint Anthony Falls, Macomb's forces would already be within visual observation by the Fort itself. Pike instead chose in January of 1831 to initially prioritize the training efforts of the Republic on a single reconnaissance unit, who upon completion of training would then be deployed in haste to observe Macomb's movements in order to facilitate accurate reporting, which would thus allow Pike to prepare for the inevitable American assault upon hearing of its renewed advance, and delegated this training to occur to the newly founded 2nd North Star Reconnaissance Troop, whose parent unit within the regiment was the respectfully named 1st North Star Reconnaissance Squadron. As a result of this prioritization, the troop was the only unit in the entire Regiment to be allowed to field the remainder of the Republic's six military horses, (which had been bought from private landowners at the request of Pike with funds from the First Federal Bank by Jean Rolette.) The shortage of horses in the Regiment, aside from those on the General's staff, only gave testament to Pike's feverish want of accurate reconnaissance, as the Upper Midwest lacked a significant equestrian population. Thus, the remaining healthy stock was dispersed in due haste to recruits as they successfully completed their training at the Fort, and Pike dispatched his newly created reconnaissance troop to the Wisconsin Frontier, where it arrived on March 13th, 1831, and it began to conduct surveillance operations supervised by their troop commander, the newly commissioned Captain Henry Schoolcraft (who had been mentored and trained by Pike prior to his departure throughout the Winter of 1830, as Schoolcraft lacked serious military experience.) Pike's need for reliable reporting proved to be successful and highly beneficial, and Schoolcraft's first three horseback couriers returned to Fort Pike on April 3rd, 1831, and these couriers were quickly followed by the remainder of the Troop, who returned to the Fort on April 4th. Schoolcraft quickly announced to Pike that Macomb's forces had finally broken winter quarters on April 2nd and were resuming their offensive westward, and Pike immediately began to position his men in preparation for the defense of the Fort and its small bridge crossing, which it arguably controlled.



Pike's overall military strategy for the defense of Fort Pike and the surrounding area relied solely on the inherent goal to deny the Americans the ability to capture Saint Anthony Falls, which housed nearly 10,000 Northwoods dissenters (who had arrived in the area between 1828 and 1830, mostly to challenge the ominous Fort Pike after the Saint Anthony Falls incident, as it was the only physical manifestation of the United States government in the entire region) and was thus the largest concentration of secessionists in the entire Upper Midwest, as the dissenters had not yet dispersed due to the occupation of the majority of their homes, as many hailed from Green Bay or Prarie du Chien, the Wisconsin territory's two largest settlements and the third and fourth (respectively) largest settlements in the Upper Midwest, and the economic opportunities presented by such a significant gathering of people that had never before been seen in the area were regarded as heavily appealing, even though the town's ability (which had previously hosted only a tenth of this population) to appropriately house such a large gathering was clearly evident within the first two years of the dissenter's arrival, which had grown exponentially over the years following the Tariff of 1828's implementation due to the works of Carver's "Minnesota Voyager," which had called Northwoods settlers to migrate to the area to join in the ongoing public demonstrations. It likewise contained the Republic's only two official government bodies, the headquarters and the first establishment of the First Federal Bank and the elected Council of the Northwoods, and the capture and subsequent shattering of these institutions would ultimately bring about the end of the Upper Midwest's yearn for independence. The natural obstacle to this strategy, however, lied in the advantage that Macomb possessed in numbers. Even despite the arrival of foreign aid and thus the rapid fielding of a full 3,000 man infantry regiment in its entirety by April, Macomb's forces in the Wisconsin theater still equaled nearly 5,700 men between two regiments (the 2nd and 5th Infantry) and as a result contained a distinct advantage in terms of manpower, even though the quality of his men was arguably much lower in comparison to the emboldened Northwoods settlers due to the sudden loss of morale that his formations experienced as a direct consequence of Pike's publicly successful Wisconsin Campaign. This level of obstacle provoked Pike to instead draft unique ideas to offset this obvious disadvantage, and throughout the latter months of 1830 and the early months of 1831, both Fort Pike and its surrounding areas had undergone several improvements under the General's esteemed direction, and the introduction of further military manpower (and thus labor) in order to expedite these preparations had also lead to their unexpected scheduled completion even despite poor weather and climate conditions. The walls of the Fort itself had been heavily refortified and improved, and had also been expanded to allow the emplacement of three twelve-pound Napoleonic era cannons on its southern walls, which had been commandeered by Harold Degard from Bellevue, Nebraska, in June of 1830 and had arrived at the Fort in November. Powder and shot for the cannons was also supplied by Degard, but proved trivial to Pike's future scheme of defense. This small cache however was further increased due to the arrival of French foreign aid in the winter of 1830, and the Fort's small battery was thus complimented with a sufficient amount of both powder and ball, which France had supplied in their massive overland caravan (in addition to 4,000 modern rifles, an equivalent amount of small arms ammunition, powder and other ordnance) upon the shipment's offloading in Manitoba. Pike also ensured that his soldiers of the newly founded 1st North Star Field Artillery Battery (a company sized element of the overarching 1st North Star Field Artillery Battalion) were proficient in both firing and maintaining the cannons, but concluded that training only a battery in the practice of firing the cannons would suffice, and instead trained the rest of the battalion in infantry tactics - as his ability to field the entire battalion in a field artillery capacity was deemed as impractical - due to the acquisition of only three cannons, rather than twelve, which was the number widely accepted by most western military leaders as the amount of guns that would necessitate a battalion sized formation, and thus the Northwoods field artillery battalion - like its cousin cavalry squadron and to an even greater extent its cousin support battalion - was reflective of its title in name only, and contained only a small number of soldiers trained in the actual task of conducting the mission their parent element was designed to do. This task organization was largely reflective of Pike's belief that the Republic would be able to (some day) field the Regiment in accordance with its design, a design of which titled the Regiment as a fully independent fighting force, but one that could also adapt to any given strategic or tactical situation. The current situation and the strategic climate in this case called for widespread training in infantry tactics rather than training in its subordinate organization's dedicated roles, as evidenced by the Regiment's 1st North Star Support and Engineer Battalions receiving no actual training revolving around their namesakes, as they both lacked serious means of fulfilling these roles due to a lack of dedicated equipment which would facilitate their effectiveness, and this fact was emphasized by the revelation that the majority of the British advisers and the 195 experienced veterans of the Wisconsin Campaign - who had been put in charge of the Regiment's training - had experience in little else but infantry tactics.



Despite Pike's extensive preparation, however, both he and the Council realized that the American forces would not be able to be deterred from crossing the Mississippi entirely, and thus Pike's forces relied primarily on a strategy of making their crossing as costly as possible. The sole bridge leading into the Minnesota frontier that laid only 300 yards south of Fort Pike could not reasonably be destroyed or dismantled, mostly due to the fact that Pike wished for the bridge to remain in-tact for two prominent reasons. Firstly, the strategic implications that the bridge entitled to its inherent controller (which was dictated by whomever controlled Fort Pike) following the (hopefully) failed American offensive would be instrumental for the Republic, as Pike would then be able to essentially "spearhead" the Regiment's assumptive counteroffensive into Wisconsin without having to engage in untimely and drawn out fording or river crossing operations, operations of which both he and his regiment were drastically unprepared to undertake, and if the bridge remained nonexistent it would thus cause the Republic to lose valuable time where it could otherwise take advantage of Macomb's defeat or possibly even utter removal in the theater in a relatively hasty manner. These fording operations, if undertaken, also posed the threat of damaging Northwoods equipment and rifles, as the majority of the era's weapons and the powder required to fire them were far from waterproof, and although it possessed a surplus of modern military equipment due to the arrival of foreign aid, potential losses of this equipment (specifically rifles and ammunition) that was deemed as utterly irreplaceable due to the American blockade of Lake Superior, the Mississippi and (recently) the Hudson Bay proved as a major deterrent to dismantling the bridge. Secondly, Pike's preparations had largely assumed that Macomb, upon learning that the bridge remained in tact, would invest his efforts into crossing the bridge to establish a foothold on the Mississippi's western shore, (as evidenced by the construction of breastworks on both the western and eastern ends of the bridge,) as crossing the Mississippi to siege the Fort itself in other places would likewise prove impractical due to his forces' similar inexperience in crossing rivers through fording. Pike also assumed that in order for Macomb to bring his cannon to bare (as it was confirmed by Schoolcraft earlier that Macomb possessed artillery, although it was unknown as to what amount) he would have to explore this only obvious land connection, as the American artillery cannons, the heavy equipment required to service them, and the personnel required to man them were similarly irreplaceable, and crossing the Mississippi either far south of the Fort in order to avoid a direct confrontation or far north to do the same would prove to be a similarly impractical option for not only his cannons, but for his forces as a whole, as exploring this option also left Pike with the option of simply abandoning the Fort in order to engage Macomb during his crossing operations, and thus provided a risk that the Northwoods regiment could even possibly completely envelop Macomb's forces. Furthermore, Pike's preparations had previously called for clear and open fields of fire in order to better accommodate Fort Pike's naturally strategic position, and many of the Northwoods soldiers under Pike's direction had uprooted and dismantled natural cover that would otherwise have been used for protection by the Americans against Northwoods small arms fire, which was likely to come as soon as Macomb initiated his crossing attempt, and thus a considerable investment of the Americans into crossing the bridge would force Macomb to commit his whole force into doing so, as keeping the continuity of his forces in-tact under withering small arms fire from the Fort's establishment would (in Pike's opinion) have to be done en masse, rather than in piecemeal, as Macomb would likely understand that the costly crossing of the river onto its western bank in order to challenge the Fort directly would require all of the forces at his disposal in order to offset his expected losses, and likely understood his advantage in numbers. This would thus create a natural bottleneck, as Macomb would essentially "rush" his forces across the bridge in order to shorten the amount of time they would spend under fire in open terrain, and the bridge (although well maintained) could not feasibly support nearly all 5,500 men at once due to its rather narrow nature, as it had been developed only as a footbridge for traders and for supply trains that had once frequented the area in order to supply the Fort with provisions, and thus had not been built in order to accommodate heavier traffic, but nonetheless it was determined as structurally sound and was likely to hold even under a "rush" of soldiers.



On April 11th, 1831, Macomb's forward scouts had finally advanced within visual range of Fort Pike itself after crossing the eastern leg of the Mississippi, and Pike, upon hearing news of their arrival, quickly and deliberately positioned his men, and ordered Schoolcraft to dispatch his scouts to conduct reconnaissance in order to understand Macomb's movements. Schoolcraft, upon arriving in the Mendota peninsula, reported that the American main body had halted ominously only eight miles east of the Fort in an area later known as Mendota Heights, just beyond visual range. Macomb spent two days under no apparent pressure conducting forward reconnaissance of the area further west in order to best dictate where his crossing would be conducted, and after perceiving no threat of engagement, he resumed his advance on April 14th, 1831, halting once again that night with his entire force in tow at a small cemetery (later known as Saint Peter Cemetery) in the northwestern portion of the Mendota peninsula just short of the Minnesota River's eastern bank. Schoolcraft and his scouts withdrew from the peninsula, and on the morning of April 15th, the apparently "sudden" appearance of nearly 5,500 American soldiers encamped on the other side of the river and only 3 miles from the Fort's walls shook both Pike and his men's confidence, and this confidence was further shaken by Macomb's emplacement of his guns along the eastern shore of the river, which had been observed and reported with great urgency by the men manning Fort Pike's walls. On the morning of April 16th, Macomb's artillery had effectively dug in, and proceeded to shell Fort Pike indiscriminately, thus firing the first shots of the Minnesota Campaign. The bombardment lasted for nearly 20 entire minutes before subsiding, and had mainly been conducted by Macomb in order to ascertain the extent of both the Fort's readiness and the Northwoods preparation. Macomb and his staff were shocked to discover that their scouts reported observing a large number of uniformed Northwoods soldiers during the bombardment, and this information thus lead Macomb to believe that Pike commanded and fielded men far beyond expected or estimated numbers. Furthermore, the bombardment had done little to damage the Fort structurally, as Pike's dedicated effort to reinforce its walls during the winter of 1830 had done much to improve its already sound integrity, and as a result of the long 20 minute bombardment, the Regiment's casualties numbered only 1 dead and 5 wounded, which was unknown to Macomb, but the absence of large amounts of Northwoods soldiers being evacuated from the Fort to seek medical attention for their wounds in Saint Anthony Falls (which housed the region's only medical treatment facility) only provided testament to the ineffective bombardment, as Macomb's scouts counted only a handful doing so. Macomb's artillery, conversely, had expended nearly 100 rounds of ammunition to little obvious benefit, and this artillery and its ammunition and powder stockpile had previously been one of the primary factors that had initially delayed Macomb's ability to hastily maneuver through the Wisconsin Frontier, as Macomb had expected it to play a pivotal role in the capture of Fort Pike. Macomb was nonetheless under an immense amount of political pressure to capture the Fort, as constant correspondence between the General and President Jackson in Washington occurred almost daily by courier, even despite the obvious distance between both his current location and the Potomac. Macomb thus knew his "time" to properly soften the Northwoods defenses before attempting a crossing westward was limited, as any perceived hesitance to do so would lead to repercussions from Jackson and Congress. On the afternoon of April 16th, Macomb dislodged his artillery from their position on the eastern bank, and redeployed his cannons further south and directly east of the foot bridge, in an effort to force soldiers of Pike's 5th and 6th Rifle Companies of his 2nd Infantry Battalion, who maintained the breastworks on the eastern and western sides of the bridge, to displace. On the morning of April 17th, Macomb's artillery once again fired in anger, as his apparent redeployment of cannon had not (apparently) shaken the defender's resolve to such a degree as to force their withdrawal, and they began targeting the eastern-most Northwoods breastworks. Macomb was pleased that a significant amount of casualties were reported, but the 10-minute bombardment had expended a similar 50 rounds of cannon shot, and the casualties to the Northwoods companies, while significant, (23 killed, 62 wounded) had done little to dislodge the Northwoods defenders, who despite the intense bombardment still remained behind their well built breastworks - any damage to which had been hastily repaired following the bombardment's conclusion. Macomb, out of options and steadily running out of ammunition for his artillery, thus prepared for his assault, as the ammunition remaining for his cannons could not be reasonably expended if not coupled with an American advance.



Macomb's scouts, by April 17th, had produced a staggering amount of information regarding the Fort's preparations and the manpower that Pike had at his disposal, and estimated the Northwoods defenders to thus be composed of anywhere between 2,500 to 3,500 uniformed regulars. Reports from these scouts later counted the arrival of nearly 800 Northwoods militia on the night of April 16th, who had arrived (presumably) from Saint Anthony Falls upon the revelation that Macomb's forces had arrived on the Mendota Peninsula, which was likely announced by the loud reports from his guns on the mornings of April 16th and 17th, if not by courier. Macomb estimated that further arrival of militia would only add to the already difficult task of crossing the river, and thus every day he waited to do so, he risked the chance of losing his advantage in numbers. Macomb's logistical difficulties of providing more ammunition for his cannons (which by this point had expended a staggering 150 rounds) also proved as highly untenable, in credit due to the distance between himself and the United States' only major resupply hub for their forces in the theater at the occupied town of Green Bay, which laid an extensive 250 miles overland to the east. Thus, waiting for ammunition for his cannons - assuming that Washington would even approve further reallocation of war material - would only lead to Pike and the Northwoods defenders further strengthening their position, as Macomb estimated that more Northwoods militia would likely steadily arrive in order to aid in the Fort and its crossing's defense, and thus by the time Macomb could expect the arrival of more provisions, men, or supplies, he would be in an even worse position to contest the Northwoods foothold regardless. The scouts had also revealed that the foot bridge and its surrounding area was completely devoid of cover - as the vast majority of the trees and rocks surrounding the area had been uprooted by Pike in the winter of 1830 - and thus was in direct line of sight and fire from both Fort Pike and the breastworks, and the arrival of more militia would only add to the large amount of firepower Macomb's forces were likely to face upon attempting a crossing of the bridge. Nonetheless, despite Pike's clearly advantageous footing, Macomb had drafted plans to commence his assault on the morning of April 18th, as any further pause to cross the river was now deemed as only detrimental. The plan called for Macomb to expend the rest of his battery's ammunition stores in an effort to suppress Northwoods fire from the fort. During this bombardment, the entirety of his forces would then commence crossing the footbridge. Upon dislodging the Northwoods defenders of their breastworks on the western and eastern sides of the bridge (which was likely, as they numbered only two companies, and had been emplaced there by Pike only to harass Macomb's forces) he would then rally his forces further south on the river's western bank, and once safely out of rifle range of the Fort would then commence drafting an immediate follow-up operation to take the Fort itself. Thus, on the morning of April 18th, the Battle of Mendota Bridge (as it was later named) began with the planned American artillery barrage of Fort Pike's southeastern walls, as Macomb had not repositioned his artillery since they had emplaced on the 17th, as the position they had undertaken to shell Northwoods breastworks on the 17th still enabled them to fire on the Fort proper, which was in direct line of sight of the guns. The American 5th Infantry Regiment - who was most familiar with the terrain, as they had previously been stationed in the area - was chosen to begin the assault, and after 5 minutes of Macomb's batteries firing, advanced in line towards the Northwoods breastworks. As they entered within rifle range, Pike's 6th Rifle Company (who maintained the eastern breastworks) immediately engaged the advancing Americans. Macomb's directive called for his units to simply "stomach" the Northwoods fire, as they far outnumbered the defenders of the bridge itself, and dictated that his commanders were not to halt to return fire, as this would delay the entire advance and thus prolong the amount of time his units would remain devoid of cover. The steadily advancing 5th Infantry absorbed the Northwoods fire, and quickly forced the 6th Company to withdraw, who broke cover in quick fashion and abandoned their position, crossing the bridge onto the western bank, where they joined their sister company, the 5th Rifle, and they resumed to fire on the advancing American regiment from the western breastworks. As the 5th Infantry reached the former Northwoods eastern breastworks, they also advanced within rifle range of Fort Pike itself. Despite the suppressing effects from the American artillery, the Fort began to duly engage the advancing Americans, who remained only 300 yards downriver. The 5th and 6th Rifle Companies, combined with significant fire from Fort Pike, devastated the first American companies who attempted to cross the bridge, which inherently forced them to narrow their ranks, creating an enfilading bottleneck. Nonetheless, the American advance continued, and the 5th and 6th Rifles held the eastern breastworks under continued pressure. Some of the 5th Regiment's companies had finally advanced across the bridge itself, and they discharged their rifles at the 200-man element upon closing distance, which was followed by intense melee combat. As the rate of fire between the two clashing elements dropped dramatically due to hand-to-hand combat, the Northwoods companies were quickly overwhelmed, and they withdrew north to Fort Pike hastily, coming under unintentional friendly fire from both their own forces and the Americans as they fled, who now possessed both the western and eastern banks of the river. By the time the two companies reached the fort, they had both lost nearly 75% of their original numbers - roughly 150 men - in as little as five minutes. Regardless, as the 5th Regiment began to push south along the river's western bank in accordance with Macomb's strategy, they came under cannon fire as well, which surprised both Macomb and his men, as the knowledge that Pike possessed cannons had previously been unreported. As the remainder of the 5th Regiment continued to cross the bridge (which was followed closely by Macomb's 2nd) the American bombardment which had previously been successful in suppressing a large amount of Northwoods fire had ceased, as their ammunition was now depleted, and Fort Pike responded with further accurate and organized small arms fire.



A grueling fifteen minutes after the initiation of the pre-assault bombardment, the battle was finally over. Macomb and his men in their entirety had crossed the bridge, and he quickly established a strong perimeter roughly 1,000 yards south of Fort Pike - out of range of both Pike's rifles and his cannons - and consolidated their gains, and Macomb began to quickly ascertain his losses in order to explore the feasibility of a continued campaign against Pike. Macomb's personal experience during the crossing (as he, too, had to personally undertake the perilous endeavor under Northwoods fire) had lead the General to believe that his losses were severe, as the bodies that littered both the bridge, its eastern and western breastworks, and the ground immediately south of the western breastworks were observed by him as "remarkably more blue than green." Macomb's belief proved to be correct as reports from his commanders filtered into his headquarters. Of the 5,500 men who had conducted the crossing of the Mendota Footbridge and had thus participated in the appropriately named Battle of Mendota Bridge, over 600 laid dead, and nearly 1,200 had been wounded - 1,800 casualties, or three entire battalions - roughly half of an entire regiment. Conversely, Macomb's forces had only inflicted only roughly 200 casualties on the entrenched and well fortified Northwoods soldiers, as his strategy had provided little opportunity for engagement, and instead focused primarily on obtaining ground far more promising for a future campaign. Furthermore, Pike had retaken the western breastworks of the crossing, and had rebuilt them in order to provide cover to the south, rather than to the east as had been the previous design, eliminating the bridge from further use and cutting off Macomb's only likely avenue of escape, other than crossing the lengthy Minnesota River, an idea of which now proved as even more impractical than before due to the wounded under his command, many of which were unable to even walk. Thus, with the consequences of the battle now fully understood, Macomb knew, however, that simply withdrawing from the theater after incurring so many losses would be utterly foolish, and instead designed plans to assault the Fort directly, in great credit due to the much more favorable ground he had obtained, an investment of which Macomb regarded as being able to succeed, if campaigned correctly, although many on his staff, including his regimental and battalion commanders, completely disagreed with the thought of a continued operation, and argued that the General was simply too ambitious and required rest in order to better facilitate his decision making. Likewise, by the night of April 18th, 1831, Pike also had concluded computing his losses, but most importantly, had also considered his gains. His regiment had performed beyond his wildest expectations. Of the bodies that laid dead and of the soldiers under his command that laid wounded inside the Fort or in Saint Anthony Falls (as some of the more severe wounded were evacuated to the settlement in order to receive more extensive medical attention,) Pike's men counted exactly 598 American dead - and speculated that anywhere from an equal quantity to twice this number had also been wounded in action - while the regiment had incurred only 160 fatalities and 43 wounded. Furthermore, the Regiment had expended only a small amount of ammunition in proportion to its previously successful Wisconsin Campaign. The arrival of the French 1826 Delvigne Rifle in great numbers due to French foreign aid in the winter of 1830 had thus allowed the rifle to become the standard issue rifle of the 1st Infantry, and in many ways was the key creditor to this fact, as the accuracy of the rifle coupled with its unique barrel design and specific ammunition which complimented this design had greatly enhanced the Regiment's efficiency in combat. Statistically, the Regiment had expended a combined total of 80 rounds of cannon and over 36,000 rounds of ammunition in the short, 15 minute engagement, a pure marvel considering the forces involved and the casualties inflicted, and Pike thus was assured by these figures that his ammunition stores contained more than enough to allow him to further contest Macomb's forces.



After a day respite, Macomb began to converse with his regimental and battalion commanders in order to develop plans to assault Fort Pike. His battalion and regimental commanders - many of which formerly, only two days prior, had been commanders of companies and platoons, as many of his original battalion and regimental commanders had been killed - were shocked at the General's belief that a campaign could be continued. The 2nd and 5th Infantry Regiments at the hands of the fighting on the 18th, they argued, had been made completely combat ineffective, and the units were quickly running out of provisions, which was further emphasized by the complete exhaustion of Macomb's artillery ammunition following the conclusion of the April 18th engagement. They instead advocated withdrawal - and after deliberation, which concluded that this too, was impossible - they instead advocated surrender. Macomb's inability to understand his force's current composition (or more appropriately decomposition) was largely credited to combat fatigue and stress incurred during the battle on April 18th. His sudden changes in mood, which were reportedly rampant, and relative disbelief that he had obviously been strategically and tactically defeated only gave testament to this belief, and by April 19th, his adjutant, Major Thomas Childs, quickly reported to Washington that Macomb had been rendered emotionally incompetent. This was also largely credited to the stress of his command, as his constant correspondence with Jackson played a significant toll on the General's mental competency, as the President frequently threatened Macomb with threats of demotion if he did not succeed in his objective to crush the Northwoods settlers, and in large part this threat had become more frequent due to Macomb's apparent failure in the Wisconsin Campaign. By April 20th, Macomb had withdrawn into complete isolation from his staff, and began to drink heavily. Upon finding the once esteemed General intoxicated, Macomb was formally relieved of command by Childs, and this event culminated to an extreme measure on April 21st, where it was reported and later confirmed that Macomb had taken his own life by self inflicted gunshot. The American forces, disenfranchised and broken, soon after surrendered under a white flag on April 22nd to Pike, effectively ending the Minnesota Campaign.